How Copyright Drives Innovation: A Case Study of Scholarly Publishing in the Digital World by Mossoff, Adam
HOW COPYRIGHT DRIVES INNOVATION: 
A CASE STUDY OF SCHOLARLY PUBLISHING 
IN THE DIGITAL WORLD 
Adam Mossoff* 
2015 MICH. ST. L. REV. 955 
ABSTRACT 
Conventional wisdom holds that copyright is solely an 
incentive to spur authors to create new works, but copyright does 
more than just incentivize artists to create: It also enables publishers 
to distribute new works in the marketplace. In detailing this long-
neglected commercialization function of copyright, this Article fills 
two gaps in the literature. First, it reestablishes the longstanding 
commercialization function of copyright by reviewing case law and 
statutes that reflect this key policy. Second, it presents for the first 
time empirical data on $100s millions in investments and on related 
transaction costs incurred by scholarly publishers today. Scholarly 
publishing is an ideal case study because academic authors are not 
motivated by conventional copyright incentives; thus, it makes more 
salient the function of copyright law in incentivizing market 
intermediaries like publishers. Ultimately, this Article identifies the 
commercialization function of property rights in creative works and 
dispels the myth that the digital world is one of “zero cost” 
publication.  
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INTRODUCTION 
With rare exception, today’s public policy debates frame 
copyright policy in terms of a “trade off” between incentivizing new 
works against the social-deadweight losses arising from the access 
restrictions imposed by these (temporary) “monopolies.”1 
Unfortunately, this policy framing has led scholars, commentators, 
and ultimately legal decision-makers to discount or simply overlook 
the costs incurred and benefits created by publishers—the market 
intermediaries who invest in creating both value-added features to 
authors’ works and new distribution mechanisms that put these 
works into the hands of consumers. Of course, copyright does 
incentivize the creation of new works, securing to authors the fruits 
of their labors.2 But courts have repeatedly recognized that this is not 
                                                     
 1. There are far too many articles reflecting this conventional wisdom to 
cite in a single footnote, but one of the most common citations for this proposition is 
the famous article by William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, An Economic 
Analysis of Copyright Law, 18 J. LEGAL STUD. 325, 326 (1989). Another is Glynn S. 
Lunney, Jr., Reexamining Copyright’s Incentives-Access Paradigm, 49 VAND. L. 
REV. 483, 485 (1996). For a few recent examples of this reductionist claim that 
copyright policy is solely about balancing the incentive to create new works against 
access restrictions on these works, see John M. Owen, Graduated Response Systems 
and the Market for Copyrighted Works, 27 BERKELEY TECH. L. J. 559, 611 (2012) 
(“Striking the correct balance between enforcement costs . . . and the benefits of 
providing incentives to create new works, lies at the center of copyright protection 
policy concerns.”); Aaron Perzanowski & Jason Schultz, Digital Exhaustion, 58 
UCLA L. REV. 889, 921 (2011) (“[T]he goal of the copyright system is to balance 
incentives to create new works with the public’s ability to use and enjoy 
them . . . .”). For a rare exception to this conventional wisdom, see Jonathan M. 
Barnett, Copyright Without Creators, 9 REV. L. & ECON. 389, 390 (2013) (focusing 
on the commercialization function of copyright).  
 2. Princeton Univ. Press v. Mich. Document Servs., Inc., 99 F.3d 1381, 
1399 (6th Cir. 1996) (en banc) (Ryan, J., dissenting) (quoting Nat’l Rifle Ass’n of 
Am. v. Handgun Control Fed’n of Ohio, 15 F.3d 559, 561 (6th Cir. 1994)) 
(“Copyrights provide an incentive for the creation of works by protecting the 
owner’s use of his or her intellectual creation, allowing creators to reap the material 
 How Copyright Drives Innovation 957 
the sole justification for copyright—copyright also incentivizes 
intermediaries, such as scholarly publishers who invest in and create 
innovative legal and market mechanisms for publishing and 
distributing articles that report on scientific research. 
These two policies—the incentive to create and the incentive to 
commercialize—are interrelated. Both policies are necessary in 
justifying how copyright law secures the dynamic innovation that 
makes possible the “Progress of Science.”3 If the law does not secure 
the fruits of labors of publishers who create legal and market 
mechanisms for disseminating works, then authors’ labors will go 
unrewarded as well.4  
This is not merely an “academic” inquiry into the metaphysics 
of copyright: The improper framing of copyright policy as concerned 
solely with the “incentive to create” distorts the policy debates about 
the function of copyright law and its key role in the innovative 
distribution of new works. This distortion in the policy debates is 
most salient in the field of scholarly publishing for at least two 
reasons.  
First, academic and scientific researchers are not motivated by 
the conventional copyright incentive or its economic rewards; 
instead, they seek intellectual recognition for their research efforts, 
academic or industry positions, and prestigious awards and accolades 
(e.g., Nobel Prizes).5 The mistaken belief that copyright is justified 
                                                                                                                
rewards of their efforts.”); see also N.Y. Mercantile Exch., Inc. v. 
IntercontinentalExchange, Inc., 497 F.3d 109, 118 (2d Cir. 2007) (“[T]he objectives 
of the copyright law . . . [are] to promote the advancement of knowledge and 
learning by giving authors economic incentives (in the form of exclusive rights to 
their creations) to labor on creative, knowledge-enriching works.” (quoting CCC 
Info. Servs., Inc. v. McLean Hunter Mkt. Reports, Inc., 44 F.3d 61, 65 (2d Cir. 
1994))). 
 3. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8; see also Mark Schultz, Copyright, 
Economic Fredom and the RSC Policy Brief, COPYRIGHT ALLIANCE BLOG (Nov. 20, 
2012), http://copyrightalliance.org/2012/11/copyright_economic_freedom_and_rsc_ 
policy_brief#.VN-fdHbtHUk (explaining that copyright’s constitutional mandate is 
rooted in both utilitarian and natural rights theory, which justify why copyright is a 
valid property right secured both to creators and to the private firms who 
disseminate their works). 
 4. See Bond v. Blum, 317 F.3d 385, 396 (4th Cir. 2003) (recognizing that 
assessing the impact “upon the potential market for or value of the copyrighted 
work” of an alleged fair use is fundamentally important because this “touches most 
closely upon the author’s ability to capture the fruits of his labor” (quoting 17 
U.S.C. § 107(4))).  
 5. E.g., Weissmann v. Freeman, 868 F.2d 1313, 1324 (2d Cir. 1989) 
(observing that “in an academic setting, profit is ill-measured in dollars” and that 
“what is valuable is recognition because it so often influences professional 
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solely as an incentive to create thus excludes from the policy debates 
about scholarly publishing any inquiry into or analysis of how 
copyright incentivizes the business models necessary for converting 
a new scientific discovery or technical invention into a standardized 
and high-quality article that communicates this information to other 
scholars and researchers.  
Second, the mistaken incentive-to-create conventional wisdom 
is reinforced by misinformation or simple ignorance about the 
economics of scholarly publishing in our new digital era.6 Many 
people now believe that scholarly publishers are no longer necessary 
because the Internet has made moot all such intermediaries of 
traditional brick-and-mortar economies. To wit, many people believe 
mistakenly that digital publication of reliable, high-quality, 
standardized, networked, and accessible research that meets the 
differing expectations of readers in a wide-ranging variety of 
academic disciplines and fields of research is now a “zero cost” 
activity.  
These two mistaken premises—authors unmotivated by the 
sole copyright policy and “zero cost” digital publication of scholarly 
research—have led inexorably to the conclusion that scholars receive 
none of the incentive-to-create benefits but suffer all of the so-called 
access-restriction costs of copyright.7 This has been further 
exacerbated by a recent rise in significant anti-copyright rhetoric on 
both the political left and right, which has further muddied the policy 
and legal waters.8  
                                                                                                                
advancement and academic tenure”); see also Eric Priest, Copyright and the 
Harvard Open Access Mandate, 10 NW. J. TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 377, 399 (2012); 
Michael W. Carroll, The Role of Copyright Law in Academic Journal Publishing, in 
WORKING WITHIN THE BOUNDARIES OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY: INNOVATION 
POLICY FOR THE KNOWLEDGE SOCIETY 149, 157 (Rochelle C. Dreyfuss, Harry First 
& Diane L. Zimmerman eds., 2010). 
 6. See infra notes 57-59 and accompanying text. 
 7. Pamela Samuelson, Aaron Swartz: Opening Access to Knowledge, 
SFGATE (Jan. 25, 2013, 5:05 PM), http://www.sfgate.com/opinion/article/Aaron-
Swartz-Opening-access-to-knowledge-4224697.php (“[C]opyright has become the 
single most serious impediment to access to knowledge. Academic authors, among 
others, should use the Internet as a medium through which access to knowledge can 
be greatly expanded.”). 
 8. E.g., REPUBLICAN STUDY COMM., RSC POLICY BRIEF: THREE MYTHS 
ABOUT COPYRIGHT LAW AND WHERE TO START TO FIX IT 2 (2012), 
https://www.publicknowledge.org/files/withdrawn_RSC_Copyright_reform_brief.p
df (withdrawn) (“Copyright violates nearly every tenet of laissez faire capitalism.”); 
see also John Perry Barlow, The Economy of Ideas, WIRED (Mar. 1994), 
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This climate has prevented an informed and effective policy 
debate about digital distribution of scholarly works from taking 
place, and the results have been consequential in all three branches 
of the federal government. In 2008, Congress enacted legislation 
authorizing the National Institutes of Health (NIH) to adopt an “open 
access” mandate for all peer-reviewed journal articles reporting on 
NIH-funded biomedical research,9 and on February 22, 2013, the 
Obama Administration’s Office of Science and Technology Policy 
issued a memorandum calling for all federal agencies to implement a 
“public access plan.”10 Finally, in Kirtsaeng v. John Wiley & Sons, 
Justice Stephen Breyer went far beyond the narrow statutory issue 
presented to the Court in resolving two conflicting provisions of the 
Copyright Act to reject commercialization as a policy in copyright 
law, asserting that the “Founders” sought to only “grant an author a 
limited right to exclude competition.”11 These legal decisions are 
driven in part by the incentive-to-create conventional wisdom, 
misunderstanding of the economics of scholarly publishing, and anti-
copyright rhetoric, all of which have become increasingly prevalent 
in recent years. 
In two parts, this Article provides a more complete legal, 
policy, and factual context for evaluating publishers and their role in 
creating and investing in innovative distribution mechanisms for 
reliable, high-quality, standardized, networked, and accessible 
scholarly articles. First, it reintroduces the commercialization policy 
back into the public policy debates about copyright, identifying how 
the Supreme Court, Congress, and commentators have long 
recognized that copyright secures to intermediaries like scholarly 
publishers the fruits of their labors in their innovative development 
of distribution mechanisms that distribute scientific, technical, and 
                                                                                                                
http://archive.wired.com/wired/archive/2.03/economy.ideas.html (coining one of the 
mantras of the Internet Age—“information wants to be free”). 
 9. Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-161, § 218, 
121 Stat. 1844, 2187 (2007) (authorizing the NIH to mandate that all “peer-reviewed 
manuscripts” published by scholarly journals that report on research that received 
NIH funding must be submitted “to the National Library of Medicine’s PubMed 
Central . . . to be made publicly available no later than 12 months after the official 
date of publication,” but only if “the NIH shall implement the public access policy 
in a manner consistent with copyright law”). 
 10. JOHN P. HOLDREN, MEMORANDUM FOR THE HEADS OF EXECUTIVE 
DEPARTMENTS AND AGENCIES 2, 5 (2013), http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/ 
files/microsites/ostp/ostp_public_access_memo_2013.pdf. 
 11. Kirtsaeng v. John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 1351, 1370 (2013) 
(emphasis added). 
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medical research. Second, it reports for the first time economic and 
other empirical data on scholarly publishing. Scholarly publishers 
exemplify copyright’s commercialization policy by successfully 
investing $100s millions in innovative distribution mechanisms that 
disseminate high-quality, peer-reviewed, reliable research to 
researchers throughout a wide range of academic disciplines. As is 
detailed at great length, scholarly publishers have invested in and 
continue to pay $100s millions in digital infrastructure, personnel, 
and other administrative and transaction costs in distributing the 
millions of scholarly articles published each year.12 
The empirical data is particularly important because it belies 
the widespread claim today that there is virtually “no cost” in 
creating, operating, and maintaining online and digital platforms for 
peer-reviewed scholarly articles. This basic economic fact—dynamic 
development of innovative distribution mechanisms requires 
substantial investment in both people and resources—is what makes 
the commercialization policy an essential feature of copyright law 
(and of all intellectual property doctrines). And it is for this reason 
that copyright law has long promoted and secured the value that 
academics and scholars have come to depend on in their journal 
articles—reliable, high-quality, standardized, networked, and 
accessible research that meets the differing expectations of readers in 
a variety of fields of scholarly research. 
I. COPYRIGHT PROMOTES AND SECURES COMMERCIAL 
DISTRIBUTION OF CREATIVE WORKS 
Commercial publication of copyrighted works has been a 
fundamental policy concern in copyright law since the Founding 
Era,13 despite Justice Breyer’s claim to the contrary in his recent 
Kirtsaeng opinion.14 This essential commercialization policy is built 
into the structure of copyright doctrine, as reflected in longstanding 
provisions in the federal copyright statutes that secure to authors the 
                                                     
 12. H. Frederick Dylla, One Publisher’s Journey Through the Public 
Access Debate, 32 INFO. SERVS. & USE 65, 66 (2012) (reporting that in 2009 almost 
1.5 million articles in just the scientific, technical, and medical fields were published 
by over 2,000 different publishers). 
 13. Thomas B. Nachbar, Constructing Copyright’s Mythology, 6 GREEN 
BAG 37, 44 (2002) (explaining “[t]he scope of copyright protection existing at the 
time of the framing” focused on “publication, not creation,” and thus this “is 
inconsistent with claims [today] that copyright ‘must promote creative activity’ in 
order to be valid”). 
 14. Kirtsaeng, 133 S. Ct. at 1370-71. 
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right to transfer their copyrights to third parties, such as publishers.15 
Before the 1976 Copyright Act, publication was in fact the “dividing 
line between common law and [federal] statutory protection,”16 
which reveals the extent to which publication of copyrighted works 
has long been the foundation on which rests the entire structure of 
federal copyright protection.17 The copyright system thus promotes 
authors to make use of the division of labor in an advanced 
commercial economy by benefiting from the efficiencies of labor 
specialization—authors write and publishers distribute.18 The 
commercialization policy in copyright law supporting and promoting 
the publication and distribution of copyrighted works remains as 
viable and as important in the digital age as it was in the era of 
traditional print media. 
Given the dominance in recent years of the mistaken incentive-
to-create conventional wisdom in copyright policy, the U.S. Supreme 
Court repeatedly has had to point out that this has never been the sole 
justification for the copyright system. In its 2003 decision in Eldred 
v. Ashcroft, for instance, the Court observed the basic truth that 
“copyright law celebrates the profit motive, recognizing that the 
incentive to profit from the exploitation of copyrights will redound to 
the public benefit by resulting in the proliferation of knowledge. . . . 
The profit motive is the engine that ensures the progress of 
science.”19 This understanding of copyright is fundamentally at odds 
with the unduly reductionist incentive-to-create story: It is “the 
exploitation of copyrights” in the marketplace—the commercial 
publication, sale, and distribution of authored works among the 
                                                     
 15. 17 U.S.C. § 106(3) (2006) (securing the right to commercialize a work 
by “sale or other transfer of ownership, or by rental, lease, or lending”); Copyright 
Act of 1790, ch. 15, 1 Stat. 124 (codified as amended at 17 U.S.C. § 106) (expressly 
securing the right to transfer a copyright by providing that authors or 
“persons . . . who hath or have purchased or legally acquired the copyright” had the 
“sole right and liberty of printing, reprinting, publishing and vending”).  
 16. Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 552 
(1985) (quoting H.R. REP. No. 94-1476, at 129 (1976)).  
 17. Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 552. 
 18. Id. at 547 (noting an author “commonly sells his rights to publishers 
who offer royalties in exchange for their services in producing and marketing the 
author’s work”); see also Am. Geophysical Union v. Texaco, Inc., 802 F. Supp. 1, 
27 (S.D.N.Y. 1992), aff’d, 60 F.3d 913 (2d Cir. 1994) (acknowledging, “[a]uthors 
recognize that publishers have little incentive to assume the financial risks of 
publishing unless the publisher is protected from copying. Accordingly, it is 
commonplace for authors to assign their rights of authorship to publishers . . . .”). 
 19. Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 212 n.18 (2003) (quoting Am. 
Geophysical Union, 802 F. Supp. at 27). 
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relevant consumers—that makes possible the “proliferation of 
knowledge.” In short, the Eldred Court recognized that fundamental 
copyright policy promotes both authors and publishers to proliferate 
knowledge because the profit motive drives the willingness to invest 
ex ante time and resources in creating both copyrighted works and 
the means to distribute them. 
If there was any doubt about this point, it was dispelled by the 
Supreme Court’s decision in Golan v. Holder.20 In Golan, the Court 
was faced with another legal challenge to a copyright statute rooted 
in the incentive-to-create conventional wisdom about copyright 
policy,21 and again the Court had to point out that “[n]othing in the 
text of the Copyright Clause confines the ‘Progress of Science’ 
exclusively to ‘incentives for creation.’ Evidence from the founding, 
moreover, suggests that inducing dissemination—as opposed to 
creation—was viewed as an appropriate means to promote 
science.”22 As the Golan Court explicitly pointed out, it is publishers, 
not authors, who conceive of, invest in, and thus create the 
successful market mechanisms that convert authors’ manuscripts into 
the books and articles that are transmitted via print or digital 
distribution channels to consumers of these works.  
The Supreme Court’s emphasis in Eldred and Golan on the 
fundamental commercialization policy in copyright law was neither 
radical nor novel, as courts have long been emphasizing 
commercialization as core copyright policy. In Harper & Row v. 
Nation Enterprises, the Supreme Court explicitly relied on this vital 
commercialization policy in copyright law to reject The Nation’s fair 
use claim to publish without authorization material from President 
Gerald Ford’s soon-to-be-published memoir.23 Justice Sandra Day 
O’Connor, writing for the Court, observed that “[w]here an author 
and publisher have invested extensive resources in creating an 
original work and are poised to release it to the public, no legitimate 
                                                     
 20. Golan v. Holder, 132 S. Ct. 873, 888 (2012). 
 21. In this case, Golan challenged as unconstitutional § 514 of the Uruguay 
Round Agreements Act, 108 Stat. 4976 (codified at 17 U.S.C. §§ 104A, 109(a)), 
because it restored the copyright in foreign works that had fallen into the public 
domain in the United States due to failure of foreign authors to follow procedural 
requirements under now-defunct federal copyright law, such as registration of the 
work in the U.S. Copyright Office. Golan, 132 S. Ct. at 878. Golan’s argument in 
part was rooted in the policy claim that restoring copyright protections in previously 
created works does not incentivize the creation of new works, and thus the statute 
was a violation of core copyright policy. Id. 
 22. Golan, 132 S. Ct. at 888 (internal citations omitted). 
 23. Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 546. 
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aim is served by pre-empting the right of first publication.”24 As the 
Court made clear, copyright rewards the labors of publishers just as 
much as it rewards the labors of authors. 
Even more important, in rejecting The Nation’s additional 
claim to a free speech interest in reporting on a newsworthy person 
like former President Ford, Justice O’Connor explained that “[i]n our 
haste to disseminate news, it should not be forgotten that the Framers 
intended copyright itself to be the engine of free expression.”25 This 
statement by Justice O’Connor is extremely famous, and it is oft-
quoted today by many advocates of the incentive-to-create 
conventional wisdom.26 But, unfortunately, many have forgotten the 
even more important sentence that follows it: “By establishing a 
marketable right to the use of one’s expression, copyright supplies 
the economic incentive to create and disseminate ideas.”27 In 
discussing longstanding copyright policy, Justice O’Connor 
recognized that publishers, the firms who create the legal and market 
mechanisms to distribute works, stand on equal policy footing with 
the authors whose works are distributed by them. 
This commercialization policy—that intermediaries like 
publishers should be rewarded for their labors in creating the legal 
and market mechanisms necessary to disseminate works—is 
essential to the American copyright system. In fact, it is so basic in 
copyright doctrine that many people do not notice the key role that it 
plays in determining the application of copyright law in both the case 
law and in the statutes themselves. There are so many examples that 
there are too many to review in a single Article dedicated to 
scholarly publishing, and thus we will briefly touch on two examples 
                                                     
 24. Id. at 557 (emphasis added). 
 25. Id. at 558. 
 26. E.g., Rebecca Tushnet, How Many Wrongs Make a Copyright?, 98 
MINN. L. REV. 2346, 2362 n.75 (2014) (quoting sentence); David S. Olson, First 
Amendment Based Copyright Misuse, 52 WM. & MARY L. REV. 537, 557 n.101 
(2010) (quoting same); Ned Snow, Copytraps, 84 IND. L. J. 285, 317 n.221 (2009) 
(quoting same); Michael Coblenz, Not for Entertainment Only: Fair Use and Fiction 
as Social Commentary, 16 UCLA ENT. L. REV. 265, 268 (2009) (quoting same); 
Dotan Oliar, Making Sense of the Intellectual Property Clause: Promotion of 
Progress as a Limitation on Congress’s Intellectual Property Power, 94 GEO. L. J. 
1771, 1780 n.45 (2006) (quoting same); Michael D. Birnhack, Copyright Law and 
Free Speech After Eldred v. Ashcroft, 76 S. CAL. L. REV. 1275, 1275 (2003) 
(quoting same and referring to it as a “judicial sound bite”); J.H. Reichman, 
Goldstein on Copyright Law: A Realist’s Approach to a Technological Age, 43 
STAN. L. REV. 943, 962 n.127 (1991) (book review) (quoting same). 
 27. Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 558 (emphases added). 
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in each area²the copyright statutes and the case law that applies 
them. 
In the copyright statutes, commercialization policy was an 
explicit part of Congress¶s extension of additional copyright 
protections in digital content when it enacted the Digital Millennium 
Copyright Act (DMCA) in the late 1990s.28 The DMCA provided 
greater certainty to the firms who commercialize copyrighted works, 
whether music, books, articles, or other media, that their property 
would be legally secured against the ease with which people can 
pirate these works in digital formats.29 As some representatives from 
the creative industries explained in an article published at the 
DMCA¶s ten-year anniversary:  
At its core, the DMCA enables copyright owners to protect their works 
against theft. The DMCA recognizes that thriving networks and network-
based dissemination of information, whether movies or software, need two 
things: trust and rewards for good actors. 
. . . . 
Without the assurances written into the law, copyright holders would have 
been more than hesitant to distribute their content in digital form, and to 
cut the deals with the electronics industry that have allowed the decade¶s
explosion in the portability that is so desired by an increasingly mobile 
society.30
Support for the DMCA is found not only in the arguments of 
the firms who commercially benefited from the legal protections 
secured to them by the DMCA. The courts have also recognized the 
fundamental commercialization policy that justified enactment of the 
DMCA in our new digital age. In one of the first DMCA cases, 
28. Digital Millennium Copyright Act, Pub. L. No. 105-304, 112 Stat. 2860
(1998). 
29. Matthew Schonauer, Note, Let the Babies Dance: Strengthening Fair
Use and Stifling Abuse in DMCA Notice and Takedown Procedures, 7 I/S J.L. &
POL¶Y FOR INFO. SOC¶Y 135, 151-52 (2011) (³In a broad sense, the DMCA has 
largely been a success, providing both ISPs and rights holders with more certainty 
regarding liability and enhanced protection, respectively.´).
30. Dan Glickman & Robert Holleyman, The Copyright Act a Decade
Later, BROADCASTING & CABLE (Nov. 7, 2008, 7:00 PM), http:// 
www.broadcastingcable.com/news/news-articles/copyright-act-decade-later/85386;
see also David Kravets, 10 Years Later, Misunderstood DMCA Is the Law that 
Saved the Web, WIRED (Oct. 27, 2008, 3:01 PM), http://www.wired.com/ 
2008/10/ten-years-later/ (³Based on first-hand experience, the studios would not 
have embraced the DVD technology, at least not as quickly as they did . . . . There 
was tremendous concern in releasing movies in this greatly improved format that 
could not be protected against duplication.´).
How Copyright Drives Innovation 965 
Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Reimerdes, the court soundly rejected 
the defendant’s claim that the DMCA is unconstitutional, 
recognizing that the DMCA is firmly rooted in the fundamental 
commercialization policy that animates copyright law: 
[T]he DMCA furthers an important government interest—the protection of
copyrighted works stored on digital media from the vastly expanded risk
of piracy in this electronic age. The substantiality of that interest is evident
. . . from the significance to our economy of trade in copyrighted
materials. Indeed, the Supreme Court has made clear that copyright
protection itself is “the engine of free expression.”31
The careful reader will have noticed that the court relied here 
on Justice O’Connor’s famous statement in Harper & Row that 
copyright is “the engine of free expression.”32 As explained above, 
this is not merely a paean to free speech; it is a declaration of the 
fundamental commercialization policy in copyright law, which 
creates “a marketable right” that “supplies the economic incentive to 
create and disseminate ideas.”33 The DMCA was enacted by 
Congress and applied by the courts precisely because it furthers this 
core copyright policy.  
In court decisions, one can easily recognize the 
commercialization policy at work in how the courts apply the 
doctrine of fair use set forth in § 107 of the Copyright Act. This 
makes sense, if only because the commercialization policy as applied 
to publishers was part of the judge-made doctrine of fair use long 
before it was codified by Congress in 1976. In 1841, Justice Joseph 
Story expressly invoked the commercialization policy in applying it 
to posthumously published letters in Folsom v. Marsh: 
What descendant, or representative of the deceased author, would 
undertake to publish, at his own risk and expense, any such papers; and 
what editor would be willing to employ his own learning, and judgment, 
and researches, in illustrating such works, if, the moment they were 
successful, and possessed the substantial patronage of the public, a rival 
bookseller might republish them, either in the same, or in a cheaper form, 
and thus either share with him, or take from him the whole profits?34 
31. Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Reimerdes, 111 F. Supp. 2d 294, 330
(S.D.N.Y. 2000) (footnote omitted) (quoting Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 558), aff’d 
sub nom. Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Corley, 273 F.3d 429, 459-60 (2d Cir. 
2001). 
32. Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 558.
33. Id.
34. Folsom v. Marsh, 9 F. Cas. 342, 347 (Story, Circuit Justice, C.C.D.
Mass. 1841) (No. 3,401). 
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Justice Story thus concluded that “the copyright act . . . fully 
recognizes the . . . legal proprietor of any manuscript . . . [has] the 
sole right to print and publish the same.”35 This is significant, 
because Folsom is the foundational nineteenth-century American 
court case that gave birth to what we now call “fair use” doctrine.36 
This confirms the hoary status of the commercialization policy in 
copyright law, especially as applied to publishers. 
Today, the commercialization policy is particularly evident in 
the fourth prong of the multi-factor test in § 107, which requires a 
court to assess “the effect of the use upon the potential market for or 
value of the copyrighted work.”37 In fact, the fourth factor has long 
been regarded as “the single most important element” in fair use 
analysis, revealing how fundamental commercialization is in the 
copyright system.38 The importance of the fourth factor is confirmed 
by empirical analyses of fair use cases, which reveal that the fourth 
factor has been the fulcrum by which courts engage in a policy-
balancing test to assess the strength of the infringer’s claim to “fair 
use” relative to “the impact of that use on the incentives of the 
plaintiff.”39 Of course, the incentive motivating publishers in creating 
distribution mechanisms for articles is fundamental to this 
assessment when the plaintiff is a publisher.  
Even later studies that contend that the commercialization 
justification for the fourth factor has been displaced by other tests, 
such as the “transformative use” test,40 confirm implicitly the 
salience of the commercialization policy in applications of the fair 
use doctrine.41 In the past two decades, courts have increasingly 
considered the transformative nature of an unauthorized use of a 
work when assessing whether the purpose and character of that use 
35. Id.
36. E.g., Rubin v. Bos. Magazine Co., 645 F.2d 80, 83 (1st Cir. 1981)
(stating the “doctrine of fair use had its origin in the opinion of Mr. Justice Story in 
Folsom v. Marsh”). 
37. 17 U.S.C. § 107(4) (2012).
38. Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 566; see also A.V. ex rel. Vanderhye v.
iParadigms, LLC, 562 F.3d 630, 642 (4th Cir. 2009) (quoting Harper & Row, 471 
U.S. at 566); Princeton Univ. Press v. Mich. Document Servs., Inc., 99 F.3d 1381, 
1385 (6th Cir. 1996) (citing Harper & Row to support the claim that “the Supreme 
Court has said that the most important factor is the fourth”). 
39. Barton Beebe, An Empirical Study of U.S. Copyright Fair Use
Opinions, 1978–2005, 156 U. PA. L. REV. 549, 621 (2008). 
40. Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 591 (1994).
41. See Neal Weinstock Netanel, Making Sense of Fair Use, 15 LEWIS &
CLARK L. REV. 715, 768 (2011). 
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justifies a finding of fair use.42 A transformative use employs part of 
the original work “in a different manner or for a different purpose 
from the original.”43 By definition, then, a transformative use is not a 
“market substitute” for the copyrighted work.44 Courts do not 
consider a work transformative if it would undermine a current or a 
substantially likely potential commercial market for the original 
work.45 A transformative use thus fulfills a different demand from the 
original work by significantly departing from the manner or purpose 
of the use of the same material in the original work. In sum, there is 
no threat to the investments and rewards secured to publishers under 
copyright law when a use is sufficiently transformative—the core 
commercialization policy remains the guiding principle.  
In the digital era, the commercialization policy has been 
particularly evident in the court decisions consistently rejecting fair 
use claims by peer-to-peer (P2P) services responsible for the 
unlawful distribution of millions of copies of copyrighted songs and 
movies. These cases are important because they directly address the 
question of whether changes in technology alter the fundamental 
commercialization policy that animates copyright doctrine. Given 
that scholarly publishing faces the same question of whether digital 
technology changes the legal calculus required by copyright’s 
commercialization policy—whether easy access to digital databases 
of scholarly articles justifies in part the adoption of public-access 
mandates—the consistent avowal of the commercialization policy in 
the P2P-file-sharing cases is revealing.  
In the first well-known court decision at the turn of the century 
involving an unauthorized music service, the court observed that 
even if the defendant was correct in its self-serving claim that its 
online service allegedly benefited the music labels (music 
42. E.g., Campbell, 510 U.S. at 579 (“[T]he more transformative the new
work, the less will be the significance of other factors, like commercialism, that may 
weigh against a finding of fair use.”). 
43. Pierre N. Leval, Toward a Fair Use Standard, 103 HARV. L. REV. 1105,
1111, 1116 (1990) (proposing the transformative test that now dominates fair use 
jurisprudence). 
44. E.g., BMG Music v. Gonzalez, 430 F.3d 888, 890 (7th Cir. 2008)
(rejecting defendant’s claim to fair use in illegally downloading MP3 files of 
musical works because “[m]usic downloaded for free from the Internet is a close 
substitute for purchased music”).  
45. E.g., Kelly v. Arriba Soft Corp., 336 F.3d 811, 821 (9th Cir. 2003)
(holding that it is fair for a search engine to convert digital art images into 
thumbnails in part because “[t]he thumbnails would not be a [market] substitute for 
the full-sized images”). 
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publishers), this “in no way frees defendant to usurp a . . . market” in 
“the plaintiffs’ copyrighted works,” especially when “plaintiffs have 
adduced substantial evidence that they have in fact taken steps to 
enter that market.”46 In the many P2P-file-sharing cases that have 
followed since, courts have consistently focused on the economic 
harm imposed on the music labels’ business models by P2P services 
like Napster, Grokster, and BitTorrent. As a result, courts 
consistently and soundly rejected the defense that P2P users were 
engaging in fair use. In the famous A&M Records v. Napster 
decision, for instance, the court observed that  
the record supports the district court’s finding that the “record company 
plaintiffs have already expended considerable funds and effort to 
commence Internet sales and licensing for digital downloads.” Having 
digital downloads available for free on the Napster system necessarily 
harms the copyright holders’ attempts to charge for the same downloads.47 
Accordingly, the court recognized that even if “free” 
downloading of digital music files conferred benefits to society or to 
the music labels themselves, the “harms [to] the market for plaintiffs’ 
copyrighted musical compositions and sound recordings” justified a 
finding of liability under the copyright laws.48 In short, copyright 
does not just protect authors’ incentives to create works, it also 
secures the incentives for commercial intermediaries to invest in, 
create, and maintain the market mechanisms for distribution of these 
works.  
In economic terms, the basic truth is that copyright is a 
property right.49 Like all property rights, it serves the important 
function of promoting the creation of new legal and market 
mechanisms that transfer valued assets from creators to consumers.50 
Copyright policy secures the fruits of labors of both authors and 
intermediaries—both the creators of works and the publishers who 
distribute these works. Thus, authors and publishers both serve a 
                                                     
 46. UMG Recordings, Inc. v. MP3.com, Inc., 92 F. Supp. 2d 349, 352 
(S.D.N.Y. 2000).  
 47. A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004, 1017 (9th Cir. 
2001) (citation omitted) (quoting A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 114 F. Supp. 
2d 896, 915 (N.D. Cal. 2000)). 
 48. Id. at 1017 (quoting A&M Records, 114 F. Supp. 2d at 915). 
 49. Folsom v. Marsh, 9 F. Cas. 342, 345 (Story, Circuit Justice, C.C.D. 
Mass. 1841) (No. 3,401) (referring to copyright as “private property” that is violated 
by “piracy”). 
 50. Id. at 347.  
 How Copyright Drives Innovation 969 
necessary role in fulfilling the ultimate goal of copyright to “promote 
the Progress of Science.”51 
II. DYNAMIC INNOVATION BY SCHOLARLY PUBLISHERS  
IN CREATING AND DISTRIBUTING RESEARCH ARTICLES 
The commercialization policy in copyright is not just theory. It 
reflects the economic realities of the real-world creation and 
distribution of copyrighted works, especially in the context of 
scholarly articles, and empirical data and statistics confirm this fact. 
As the Sixth Circuit recognized in 1996 in Princeton University 
Press v. Michigan Document Services: “It is the [scholarly] 
publishers who hold the copyrights, of course—and the publishers 
obviously need economic incentives to publish scholarly works, even 
if the scholars do not need direct economic incentives to write such 
works.”52 Copyright provides the necessary incentives for scholarly 
publishers to create, invest in, and sustain the business models that 
make possible the dissemination of reliable, high-quality, 
standardized, networked, and accessible research that meets the 
differing expectations of readers in a wide-ranging variety of 
academic disciplines and fields of research.53 This Part presents for 
the first time both industry-wide and publisher-specific data and 
statistics, providing unique insights into the essential role scholarly 
publishers serve in the innovative dissemination of scholarly 
research.  
For many people today, this may sound surprising, if not just 
plain wrong. This is in part a result of the unique nature of academic 
authors who both produce and consume scholarly articles; their focus 
is on what economists call the “status goods” of scholarly 
activities—who is publishing, how much, in what journals, and what 
are they saying—and not on conventional economic goods like how 
much profit an author makes from the sale of a copyrighted work. 
Accordingly, academics and scholars have little knowledge or 
interest in the traditional “business” details of journal publication. 
                                                     
 51. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. 
 52. Princeton Univ. Press v. Mich. Document Servs., Inc., 99 F.3d 1381, 
1391 (6th Cir. 1996) (en banc). 
 53. See Am. Geophysical Union v. Texaco, Inc., 802 F. Supp. 1, 16 
(S.D.N.Y. 1992), aff’d, 60 F.3d 913 (2d Cir. 1994) (“Copyright protection is vitally 
necessary to the dissemination of scientific articles. . . . This is not because authors 
insist on being compensated. To the contrary, . . . copyright protection is essential to 
finance the publications that distribute them.”). 
970 Michigan State Law Review  2015:955 
Professor Mark McCabe recently observed that academics have an 
“acute awareness of journal quality but little or no knowledge of 
other seemingly important product characteristics.”54 As an 
economist, McCabe humorously pointed out that he and his fellow 
academic “economists knew the value of their journals, but not their 
prices.”55 
This natural and understandable disinterest by scholarly 
researchers in the commercial details of the scholarly journal market 
is compounded by the mistaken incentive-to-create conventional 
wisdom.56 Accordingly, what most people hear from academics and 
other commentators is that publishers are intermediaries who impose 
costly (and unnecessary) restrictions on access to works, and, in a 
new digital world, who have failed to innovate or are just no longer 
needed at all.57 As Professor Danah Boyd writes in her blog, “I see 
                                                     
 54. MARK J. MCCABE, ONLINE ACCESS AND THE SCIENTIFIC JOURNAL MARKET: AN 
ECONOMIST’S PERSPECTIVE 2 (2013), http://sites.nationalacademies.org/xpedio/groups/ 
pgasite/documents/webpage/pga_063400.pdf. 
 55. Id.  
 56. E.g., Landes & Posner, supra note 1, at 327. 
 57. E.g., Jerome H. Reichman & Ruth L. Okediji, When Copyright Law and 
Science Collide: Empowering Digitally Integrated Research Methods on a Global 
Scale, 96 MINN. L. REV. 1362, 1461 (2012) (“[O]nce costly front-end publishing 
function has increasingly been reduced to desktop publishing and automated 
formatting, while the peer-review function, of great importance to the integrity of 
science, is performed gratis by scientists.”); Raymond Shih Ray Ku, The Creative 
Destruction of Copyright: Napster and the New Economics of Digital Technology, 
69 U. CHI. L. REV. 263, 311 (2002) (“When one recognizes that the Internet and 
digital technology eliminate the need for distributors and weaken their stranglehold 
on the public, reduce the costs of creation, and reduce the transaction costs 
associated with connecting artists to the public, most artists may in fact be far better 
off in a world without copyright.”); Diane Leenheer Zimmerman, Authorship 
Without Ownership: Reconsidering Incentives in a Digital Age, 52 DEPAUL L. REV. 
1121, 1135 (2003) (“The fact that copyright was important to nineteenth century 
publishers, however, tells us very little about the importance of copyright to 
successful on-line publishing. Much of what the traditional publishing industry does 
in the production of hard copy is irrelevant in the on-line context. Electronic 
publishing is not capital-intensive in the way print is; it needs no large investments 
in printing plants, paper, binderies, warehouses, or shipping facilities.”); The Case 
for Open Access, PLOS, http://www.plos.org/about/open-access/ (last visited Sept. 
16, 2015) (“Paying for access to content makes sense in the world of print 
publishing, where providing content to each new reader requires the production of 
an additional copy, but online it makes much less sense to charge for content when it 
is possible to provide access to all readers anywhere in the world.”). 
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locked-down journals as a form of censorship.”58 If anyone can be a 
blogger or a self-publisher on the Internet, the argument goes, then 
scholarly research should be available for free, and access 
restrictions are illegitimate “censorship.”59 
Of course, those familiar with the economics of starting and 
running high-tech or online companies—or those familiar with the 
economics of distribution of copyrighted works—know that such 
beliefs about publishing are profoundly mistaken. In fact, such 
overly optimistic assumptions were what created the dotcom bubble 
at the turn of the century, as $100s millions in poor investments were 
premised on the then-widespread belief that the Internet allegedly 
“changed everything” by radically lowering both prices and 
production costs.60 Of course, the bubble burst as it became apparent 
that not everything had changed, as businesses had not been liberated 
from the economic realities of cost and the necessities of profit. A 
mere decade after the bursting of the dotcom bubble and the 
recession that followed, it is surprising that this same incorrect 
assumption is driving policy analyses of scholarly publishing and 
                                                     
 58. Danah Boyd, Open-Access Is the Future: Boycott Locked-Down 
Academic Journals, APOPHENIA (Feb. 6, 2008), http://www.zephoria.org/thoughts/ 
archives/2008/02/06/openaccess_is_t.html. 
 59. See, e.g., id. (arguing that “[t]he traditional model of journal publishing 
makes sense in an era where the only mechanism of distribution was paper.” She 
thus declares that academics should “stop being silenced by academic publishers,” 
and that they should “[p]ublish with open-access online-only journals,” which she 
envisions as being run by “communities of volunteer scholars.”). 
 60. E.g., Tim Harford, Don’t Judge a Book by Its Cover Price: The 
Undercover Economist, FIN. TIMES (Aug. 11, 2012, 6:35 PM), 
http://www.ft.com/cms/s/2/46fd87c8-e0f2-11e1-8d0f-00144feab49a.html 
(explaining, “[o]f course $23,698,655.93, plus shipping, is a lot to pay for a book—a 
long way from the dream that the internet would usher in an era of perfect price 
transparency, in which consumers would discover the cheapest products and prices 
would inevitably fall to the cost of production. (Not everyone making this case in 
the dotcom-bubble era realised that it was inconsistent with the other touchstone 
principle of the time, that internet companies would be insanely profitable.)”); V. 
Prathaban, SAP Banks on Current Spate of M&A’s, BUSINESS TIMES, June 1, 2002, 
at 8 (“Last year, the event focused on the theme of New, New Economy in a bid to 
debunk myths that were closely associated with the dotcom meltdown. For instance, 
it was widely believed that the dotcom era would bring to an end the brick-and-
mortar businesses. In addition, it was also thought that dotcoms would bring about 
significant changes across various industries, thus further reducing costs and 
providing great value to consumers.”).  
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real-world regulations like public access mandates for scholarly 
research.61 
In addition to reintroducing the commercialization policy back 
into the policy debates concerning scholarly articles, it is thus 
necessary to replace mistaken rhetoric with actual facts. Given the 
paucity of economic data in the policy debates about scholarly 
publishing, we need to detail scholarly publishers’ substantial ex ante 
investments of $100s millions and their ongoing development of 
innovative business models in distributing reliable, high-quality, 
trustworthy, standardized, networked, and accessible research to a 
wide-ranging and diverse community of scholars. Thus, this Part 
provides this important and necessary context for evaluating 
scholarly publishers’ role in disseminating research in copyrighted 
journal articles. 
Scholarly publishers have long represented the basic economic 
principle that the division of labor—especially the economies of 
scale achieved through aggregation and specialization—is 
fundamental to a successful and flourishing marketplace. For 
example, one of the largest scholarly publishers, Reed Elsevier, 
founded in 1880, publishes approximately 2,000 journals, including 
the famous Lancet, as well as Cell, Physica, and The Journal of the 
American College of Cardiology, among many others.62 John Wiley 
and Sons (Wiley), which publishes approximately 1,500 journals, 
first entered the publishing business in 1807.63 Even medium-sized 
                                                     
 61. See, e.g., Priest, supra note 5, at 389 (“Since the advent of e-journals 
and digital scholarship archives, several traditional functions of publishers have 
become less essential to the production and dissemination of scholarly articles . . . . 
[W]hile there are certainly costs involved in providing these services, they do not 
necessarily justify the high prices many journals charge . . . .”); ELLIOTT E. 
MAXWELL, THE FUTURE OF TAXPAYER-FUNDED RESEARCH: WHO WILL CONTROL 
ACCESS TO THE RESULTS? 30 (2012), https://www.ced.org/pdf/The-Future-of-
Taxpayer-Funded-Research.pdf (“Running a digital repository is relatively 
inexpensive—arXiv spends about $7 per article.”); cf. Dan Hunter, Open Access to 
Infinite Content (or “In Praise of Law Reviews”), 10 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 761, 
769 (2006) (“Cheap digital storage and transmission through distributed networks 
means that the cost of putting content on the network is fast moving towards zero.”). 
 62. Telephone interview with Brad Fenwick, Vice President of Global 
Academic & Research Relations, Karen Hunter, Senior Vice President, Eric 
Massant, Senior Director of Government & Industry Affairs, and Alicia Wise, 
Director of Universal Access, Reed Elsevier (Dec. 17, 2012).  
 63. Telephone Interview with Patrick Kelly, Publishing Director, Wiley 
(Dec. 19, 2012) (noting many publishers also partner with learned societies and 
other scholarly organizations to publish journals for these groups. Wiley, for 
instance, publishes 1,500 journals, but approximately 800-850 of these are published 
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publishers achieve economies of scale in efficient investment and 
distribution of scholarly articles. SAGE Publications Ltd. (SAGE), 
for instance, which was founded in 1965 and began publishing its 
first journal that year, Urban Affairs Quarterly, now publishes more 
than 700 journals, having recently acquired the publishing operations 
of the Royal Society of Medicine.64 Also, as in all vibrant markets in 
which exists a diversity of producers and consumers, there also are 
small, specialized publishers, such as the venerable New England 
Journal of Medicine, which has been publishing its famous journal 
since 1812.65 From the very beginnings of the modern copyright 
system, the creation of scholarly articles has exemplified the 
economic truth that animates all enterprises in which specialization 
between manufacturers and distributors—authors and publishers—
creates successful products, flourishing enterprises, and happy 
consumers.66 
While business models and distribution mechanisms certainly 
have changed in the digital age, publishers’ essential role in 
efficiently distributing vast numbers of articles remains. In 2009, for 
instance, almost 1.5 million articles in just the scientific, technical, 
and medical fields were published by over 2,000 different 
publishers.67 Of course, contrary to conventional wisdom about the 
Internet,68 digital distribution of millions of scholarly articles 
published year after year is not free (something that many people are 
familiar with in the context of newspapers and weekly magazines). 
In fact, the same economic dilemma justifying the incentive-to-create 
conventional wisdom—authors must invest substantial time and 
resources in creating a new work that can be easily copied once it is 
publicly released in the world—is equally relevant for the 
                                                                                                                
on behalf of organizations that have employed Wiley’s publishing expertise, such as 
the American Cancer Society. For these 800-850 journals, the owners of the journals 
maintain editorial control, and Wiley provides publication services, as well as 
provides the digital and other services on the backend).  
 64. Telephone Interview with Martha Sedgwick, Senior Manager, Online 
Products Team, SAGE (Dec. 13, 2012).  
 65. Telephone Interview with Christopher Lynch, Vice President for 
Publishing, and Christine Lamb, Director of Marketing, New England Journal of 
Medicine (Dec. 14, 2012).  
 66. See Am. Geophysical Union v. Texaco, Inc., 802 F. Supp. 1, 4 
(S.D.N.Y. 1992) (explaining, “[l]earned journals play an important role in scientific 
research. They serve to disseminate broadly and with reasonable rapidity the results 
of scientific research being conducted in many places.”), aff’d, 60 F.3d 913 (2d Cir. 
1994).  
 67. Dylla, supra note 12, at 66. 
 68. See supra text accompanying notes 31-32. 
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distributors of these same works. Just as publishers invested in new 
business models and technology during the Industrial Revolution—
publishers invested millions of dollars in creating and running the 
printing presses, creating and maintaining storage facilities, creating 
and maintaining supply chain and distribution channels, and in 
creating new business models—they are again making equally 
massive investments in today’s digital revolution. 
Scholarly publishers embraced the opportunities represented by 
the Internet in the very early years of the evolution of the World 
Wide Web after 1993, switching to digital submission and review 
processes as well as to digital publication. For example, one of the 
medium-sized scholarly publishers, the American Institute of 
Physics, which now publishes approximately twenty journals, 
switched to digital production as early as 1995, and it placed all of its 
journals online by 1997.69 The American Chemical Society, which 
now publishes forty-two journals, launched its first digital journal in 
1996, and it has been steadily increasing its digital publications since 
that date.70 As part of the ACS Legacy Archives project, in 2002 the 
American Chemical Society digitized all 465,000 articles published 
in its journals between 1879 and 1995.71 Since 1996, the American 
Chemical Society has responded to the explosive growth in the 
scientific, technical, and medical disciplines by increasing the 
number of journals it publishes by about one per year and increasing 
production generally, resulting in it publishing slightly more articles 
in the previous seventeen years (1996-2012) than the total number of 
articles it published in the previous 118 years (1879-1995).72 
                                                     
 69. Telephone Interview with H. Frederick Dylla, Executive Director and 
CEO, American Institute of Physics (Dec. 20, 2012). 
 70. Telephone Interview with Sara Tegen, Rob O’Dell, and Jonathan 
Morgan of the American Chemical Society (Dec. 12, 2012).  
 71. Id. 
 72. See id. (noting the American Chemical Society does not create new 
journals willy-nilly, as some people mistakenly believe about scholarly publishers. 
Before a new journal is founded, the American Chemical Society undertakes 
substantial research into whether it is justified by the growth in or appearance of a 
scholarly discipline, including having analyses done by Ph.D.-level acquisitions 
editors, obtaining input from existing American Chemical Society editors, and 
surveying interest in the relevant scientific community. Moreover, once a journal is 
founded, the American Chemical Society implements internal processes to ensure 
quality control; for instance, each journal has an editorial advisory board consisting 
of on average twenty to fifty international scientists in a specific discipline. The 
American Chemical Society also organizes annual board meetings for each of its 
forty-two journals, at which these advisory boards continually work to improve the 
quality of the journal.). 
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The larger scholarly publishers proved just as nimble in 
adopting digital technology and, as a result, incurred substantial costs 
in this radical shift in production processes.73 In 1995, Reed Elsevier 
began development of its online publishing platform, ScienceDirect, 
which it beta tested throughout 1997-1998 and rolled out to its 
customers in 1999.74 The initial development costs for ScienceDirect 
were approximately $26 million, which was a small part of the total 
investment in this platform, and Reed Elsevier’s initial investment in 
creating digital archives of previously published content cost 
approximately $46 million.75 Ultimately over the past two decades, 
Reed Elsevier has invested $100s millions in shifting to digital 
production and publication of journals, as well as scanning, 
archiving, and making accessible in digital formats articles 
previously published in print format.76 Wiley launched its online 
publication platform in 1996, called Wiley Interscience, which was 
ultimately replaced by Wiley Online Library, which remains in use 
today.77 Wiley’s and other scholarly and academic publishers’ shift to 
online and digital archives and production in the 1990s was also the 
result of investments amounting to $100s millions.78 The American 
Institute of Physics, which publishes twenty journals, now has an 
operating budget of approximately $50 million for its publications.79 
As tech firms can attest, such substantial investments in paying 
developers who code, scan, beta test, etc., as well as the substantial 
                                                     
 73. Kelly, supra note 63 (explaining “it is a digital-first business,” although 
“many customers still want print,” and thus Wiley provides both print and digital 
versions of its journals. About thirty to forty of its journals were born completely 
digital, and about twenty to thirty of its journals that were once print only are now 
available only in digital format, but otherwise it maintains both print and digital 
options. As the technology develops, there is a “print on demand” option for many 
customers of journals who want a print copy.). 
 74. Fenwick, Hunter, Massant & Wise, supra note 62. 
 75. Id. 
 76. Id.  
 77. Kelly, supra note 63. 
 78. Lynch & Lamb, supra note 65 (explaining the New England Journal of 
Medicine digitally archived and made accessible online in both PDF and HTML 
format all of its articles from its first publication in 1812 up through 1989—145,969 
total articles. This digital archive project included scanning and uploading 486,434 
pages, 75,649 images, and creating 610,000 cross-references in the HTML versions. 
Although there are no publicly available investment numbers for this project, based 
on similar projects by other publishers and general knowledge of the high-tech 
industry, it is reasonable to infer that this was a multi-million dollar investment.). 
 79. Dylla, supra note 69 (noting this is out of a total annual budget of $75 
million, which means that two-thirds of its annual budget is for running its 
publications). 
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investments in purchasing and maintaining the hardware and 
software necessary to produce digital products and services, is not 
unusual; according to one estimate, the Windows Vista operating 
system, which was by all accounts a failure in the market, cost 
Microsoft approximately $10 billion to create before it sold a single 
copy.80  
In short, it is extremely costly to create online and other digital 
products and services, as investments in the initial R&D, the 
hardware and facilities, the personnel, and then the ongoing 
maintenance and further enhancement of these services are 
substantial. This is as true for publishers as it is for Microsoft and for 
Internet intermediaries, such as Google.81 Reed Elsevier, for 
example, now maintains over 90 terabytes of digital storage capacity 
from which an average of 10 million active users from 120 different 
countries download nearly 700 million articles per year.82 In 2012, 
Internet users downloaded 80 million articles from the American 
Chemical Society’s forty-two journals, which is an expansion by 
orders of magnitude from the merely one million downloads that 
occurred the first year after the American Chemical Society made all 
of its journals available online in electronic editions.83 The digital 
revolution has not eliminated transaction costs in distributing content 
between researchers and readers. It has only shifted these costs from 
physical resources like factories running printing presses and 
warehouses stocked with journals to the new physical resources in 
our digital age, such as massive “server farms” and the software and 
highly trained personnel required to create and maintain them (not to 
mention the costs of operating traditional machines required to run 
such facilities, such as, among many things, the air conditioning 
required to keep the computers from overheating).  
The digital revolution has also made it possible for publishers 
to receive and review vastly more manuscript submissions, which is 
no longer done via snail mail, and to vastly increase their publication 
                                                     
 80. Dean Takahashi, Why Vista Might Be the Last of Its Kind, SEATTLE 
TIMES (Dec. 4, 2006), http://seattletimes.com/html/businesstechnology/ 
2003460386_btview04.html. 
 81. See, e.g., Rich Miller, Google Invests $890 Million in Data Centers, 
DATA CTR. KNOWLEDGE (Apr. 15, 2011), http://www.datacenterknowledge.com/ 
archives/2011/04/15/google-invests-890-million-in-data-centers (noting that Google, 
currently the world’s largest search engine, invested $890 million in the first quarter 
of 2011 in updating its data centers).  
 82. Fenwick, Hunter, Massant & Wise, supra note 62. 
 83. Tegen, O’Dell & Morgan, supra note 70. 
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of articles as well. As noted earlier, more than 1.5 million articles in 
the science, technical, and medical fields alone were published in 
2009, an annual total publication rate by scholarly publishers likely 
thought impossible just fifty years ago.84 Along with the shift to 
online distribution of journal articles in the 1990s, scholarly 
publishers shifted to online and email submission, review, and 
production processes for manuscripts and articles. Unsurprisingly, 
author submissions have increased dramatically too given both the 
lower cost to authors in submitting manuscripts electronically and 
the continual expansion in the scholarly disciplines as the number of 
researchers grows by approximately 4% per year.85 Reed Elsevier 
now receives just over one million manuscripts annually, a number 
that is the result of a steady increase of annual submissions by 12% 
per year.86 Wiley now receives approximately 460,000–480,000 
manuscript submissions annually.87 Even small or single-journal 
publishers receive massive numbers of manuscript submissions; the 
American Institute of Physics receives slightly more than 32,000 
submissions annually,88 and the New England Journal of Medicine 
receives more than 5,000 research papers and over 15,000 total 
submissions each year.89  
Scholarly publishers do not merely process and publish these 
manuscripts. They also provide extremely important and value-added 
services and products to academics and other readers of their journal 
articles. First and foremost, they have created and continue to 
operate a peer-review system for ensuring publication of accurate, 
trustworthy, reliable, and high-quality articles that are published in 
standardized formats and which are easily accessible to the relevant 
scholarly communities. Studies have shown that while myriad 
variables influence a researcher’s decision to both publish in and 
read a particular journal, such as its “frequency of publication,” “the 
speed of the peer review process,” its specialization in the field of 
study, etc., “the important distinguishing characteristic for the 
platform and its participants is the perceived scientific quality of the 
content.”90 This high quality in the content of journal articles is 
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achieved by the peer-review system developed and maintained by 
scholarly publishers.  
Further studies confirm that academics across the scientific, 
technical, and medical disciplines strongly believe that peer review 
assists in scientific communication,91 and 90% of surveyed scholars 
in these fields agree or strongly agree that “peer review improves the 
quality of the published paper” from the submitted manuscript.92 The 
commitment to peer review has largely remained unchanged through 
the Internet revolution of the past twenty years, as scholars—who are 
both producers and consumers of journal articles—have responded 
similarly to surveys between 1993 and 2005 that “it remained highly 
valued.”93 In sum, peer review is a function of scholarly publishing 
that is widely recognized as a value-added service provided by the 
publishers, even by advocates for “open-access” publishing.94  
The peer review system is also widely misunderstood. Many 
people mistakenly think it consists almost entirely of volunteers who 
freely perform peer reviews for submitted manuscripts and with 
whom publishers easily and cheaply communicate via email or 
websites.95 This is profoundly mistaken. There are in fact an 
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extensive number of publishing staff and other reviewers who are 
directly employed or are paid as independent contractors, especially 
those serving in the official “editor” positions at the thousands of 
journals that now exist and through which the millions of articles are 
now published. These editors perform substantive review of 
manuscripts, but they also manage the volunteer academics and non-
academic scholars who serve as peer reviewers for the tens of 
millions of submitted manuscripts, incurring extensive transaction 
costs, administrative costs, and related expenses in operating the peer 
review system.  
A peer review system that successfully filters millions of 
manuscripts into a select number of high-quality, reliable, 
standardized, published articles is neither free nor cheap. Each 
publisher employs legions of internal and external editors, as well as 
other academics and scholars located throughout the world in its peer 
review system, to process the millions of submitted manuscripts 
received annually. Thus, as studies have confirmed, this is one of the 
few business operations performed by publishers in which “there are 
no economies of scale.”96 Reed Elsevier’s budget for its peer review 
system is over $100 million per year.97 This is consistent with recent 
reports that the peer review system costs approximately £1.9 billion 
annually for the scholarly publishing industry writ large.98 Other 
studies have reached similar results; for instance, the 2012 PEER 
Report found that peer review costs $250 per manuscript for salary 
and fees only, exclusive of infrastructure and overhead expenses.99 
Publishers’ operational data further substantiates why the peer 
review system is so costly. The American Chemical Society, for 
instance, one of the smaller scholarly publishers, receives via its 
digital submission process approximately 100,000 manuscripts 
annually, out of which it publishes approximately 40,000 articles.100 
In addition to the Editors-in-Chief that the American Chemical 
Society employs for each of its forty-two journals (which entails a 
time- and labor-intensive vetting and interviewing process), it also 
employs as independent contractors another 320 associate editors.101 
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The associate editors provide both substantive peer review services 
and manage the peer review process with the thousands of academics 
who provide additional review services.  
Similarly, the New England Journal of Medicine publishes 210 
research articles from the 5,000+ submissions it receives annually, 
which is entirely a result of its own extensive peer review system.102 
To maintain this highly exclusive 4%-5% acceptance rate, the New 
England Journal of Medicine employs an internal staff of ten full-
time physician editors who do substantive reviews and another ten 
associate editors who also do substantive reviews and “quarterback” 
a multi-stage review process undertaken by thousands of external 
reviewers.103 For the 7% of submitted manuscripts that make it 
through this intensive internal and external review process, the New 
England Journal of Medicine employs a staff of four statistical 
reviewers to do a final substantive review of the articles, winnowing 
down the finalists to those few manuscripts officially accepted for 
publication.104  
The larger publishing firms, such as Reed Elsevier, operate a 
similar multi-stage peer review process that is just as extensive and 
time intensive and that also involves both internal and external 
editorial personnel. Of the one million manuscript submissions 
received at Reed Elsevier journals each year, approximately 350,000 
are published as articles.105 In maintaining this 35% acceptance—or 
65% rejection rate, depending on your perspective—Reed Elsevier 
employs 950 publishers and related staff who also support and work 
with 8,000 external editors and over 90,000 external editorial board 
members.106 Publishing staff work closely with editors in performing 
a tremendous amount of substantive work in screening out 
approximately 35% of the submitted manuscripts before sending the 
remaining manuscripts to the academic and scholarly peer 
reviewers.107 Reed Elsevier editors then work with and manage 
541,500 academics and scholars who volunteer their time to do peer 
review of the manuscript submissions.108 This is anything but a low-
cost or simple enterprise to operate and manage, even in our digital 
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era, especially given the 1.3 million peer review reports annually 
received, reviewed, and acted upon by Reed Elsevier editors.109  
In addition to the extensive peer review process and its 
tremendous transaction costs, publishers incur extensive costs, either 
internally or paid to external vendors, in formatting and editing 
articles for digital publication. One recent study concluded that 
“[d]igital content publication involves many labour-intensive 
activities, including formatting, editing, [and] typesetting. Cost of 
publishing (including metadata) ranges between 170 to over 400 
USD per article . . . .”110 Assuming this number is correct, it is quite 
extraordinary. Thus, in addition to the millions of dollars invested in 
and expended annually in maintaining the digital infrastructure 
necessary to publish articles and to provide access to archives of 
millions of previously published articles, publishers spend $100s 
millions per year just on the allegedly simple activities of the digital 
equivalent of type-setting the articles. Importantly, such expenses are 
exclusive of the many post-publication services provided by 
scholarly publishers (more on this shortly).  
Many publishers provide subscribers with the option of 
receiving articles in multiple formats, such as PDF and HTML, 
which further increases productions costs. The New England Journal 
of Medicine, for instance, converts to PDF in text format, as opposed 
to image scanning, so that the article is searchable.111 As everyone 
who uses computers well knows, conversions between formats must 
be double-checked and edited, as words and specially formatted 
features, such as tables, graphs, and images, which are commonplace 
in scientific, technical, and medical publications, often do not 
survive such conversions unscathed. Additionally, the HTML 
versions of articles provide added benefits to subscribers, such as 
hypertext linking for citations both to and from the articles, a labor-
intensive coding process in creating the articles. For example, the 
American Chemical Society, a medium-sized scholarly publisher 
with only forty-two peer-reviewed journals, retains a staff of twelve 
full-time employees dedicated to digital product development, 
production, and maintenance, who are themselves supported by an 
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information technology (IT) team of 125 employees who focus on 
additional technological issues, such as security.112 
Production costs for journal articles likely range even higher 
for some journals that have acquired a reputation for extremely high-
quality images and other graphical features that are central to their 
articles, such as the New England Journal of Medicine. As with any 
well-deserved reputation for quality, such as the high-quality articles 
produced through the peer review system, there are substantial, 
behind-the-scenes investments, which create this highly important 
value. The New England Journal of Medicine, for instance, employs 
its own staff of award-winning medical illustrators who redraw and 
recompose all images submitted by the authors.113 These in-house 
illustrators ensure a consistent style and tone throughout the 
Journal’s many articles and volumes, ensuring for readers the same 
high-quality, standardized presentation of information. Moreover, as 
with the many other value-added features of the digital revolution 
embraced by publishers, the New England Journal of Medicine now 
creates video animations of the images in its articles, in which 3D 
images can be rotated along multiple axes for different perspectives, 
an extremely important capability for medical and biochemical 
researchers.114 
The costs of formatting, editing, and related article-production 
processes are just the tip of the iceberg, as there are also ongoing 
investments in developing and maintaining a vast array of online and 
digital services for both authors and readers of published articles. For 
authors, Reed Elsevier, SAGE, Wiley, and others provide email 
alerts and immediate updates to citation reports as follow-on articles 
cite to earlier articles.115 Wiley also provides authors with up-to-date 
“metrics” for its online articles, reporting total number of downloads, 
citations by follow-on articles, and even references in blogs or in 
social media (increasingly important mechanisms in information 
distribution on the Internet).116 For readers, scholarly publishers have 
invested in new technological distribution services in response to the 
revolution in recent years in smartphones and tablets. Reed Elsevier, 
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the American Chemical Society, SAGE,117 and Wiley, among others, 
have developed mobile versions of their websites and specific apps 
for the iPhone, Windows, and Android mobile platforms. Similar to 
scholarly publishers’ embrace of the innovative development of the 
World Wide Web in the early 1990s, publishers continue to respond 
quickly to ongoing technological innovation with their own 
continued investments in and development of new services for 
authors and new distribution mechanisms for readers.  
Lastly, in addition to their investment and deployment in new 
technology in both the online and mobile environments, scholarly 
publishers have also innovated new business models that have made 
it possible for more efficient access to and distribution of 
information published in the digital era. Similar to pre-digital-era 
innovative developments, such as creating the Copyright Clearance 
Center for efficient approval and licensing of the use of articles,118 
publishers recognized early on the interlinking capabilities for 
citations in scholarly articles published on the Internet. Thus, at the 
turn of the twenty-first century, scholarly publishers, including 
Wiley, the American Institute of Physics, and several others, met at 
the Frankfurt Book Fair and created and funded CrossRef.119 As 
described on its website, CrossRef is: 
A not-for-profit network founded on publisher collaboration, with a 
mandate to make reference linking throughout online scholarly literature 
efficient and reliable. As such, it is an infrastructure for linking citations 
across publishers, and the only full-scale implementation of the Digital 
Object Identifier (or DOI) System to date.120 
The significance of the creation and success of CrossRef is 
manifold. First, it represents (again) the behind-the-scenes 
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investment in and development of digital resources by scholarly 
publishers in providing a product—their articles—which maximizes 
the value of the digital format. What appears simple and obvious to 
the consumer, the hypertext linking of citations among different 
publishers, involves extensive investments in software development 
and implementation. Second, it represents the development of 
innovative business models by private firms that are dedicated to the 
creative innovation secured by intellectual property rights, such as 
cross-licensing and other aggregation business models.121 CrossRef 
states simply on its website, “Scholarly publishers developed 
CrossRef,” and while the immediate focus of CrossRef’s website is 
on its innovative technology and services, it bears emphasizing that 
the creation of this service itself was an innovative business model 
developed in response to the problem of how to internalize the costs 
of providing interlinking services to the readers of scholarly articles 
published on the Internet.122 Third, such innovative developments and 
investments continue, as CrossRef has led to FundRef, and more 
recently, ORCID, which was initially capitalized by scholarly 
publishers in 2011 at the Frankfurt Book Fair.123 As Frederick Dylla, 
Executive Director and CEO of the American Institute of Physics, 
explains, CrossRef and its progeny are a “prime example of an 
industry-led initiative.”124 
In addition to innovative business models and technologies 
such as CrossRef, scholarly publishers have also innovated in and 
developed other business models in the online and digital 
environment. In the 1990s, for example, Reed Elsevier developed 
TULIP, an online journal distribution project involving more than 
eighty journals in partnerships with seventeen universities and that 
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lasted for four years.125 The American Chemical Society collaborates 
with its sister division, the Chemical Abstract Service (CAS), and 
with numerous third-party vendors, including PubMed and Google.126 
More recently, publishers, such as Reed Elsevier, Wiley and many, 
many others, partnered with DeepDyve.com, which provides access 
to scholarly articles on a per-article-fee basis, similar to the business 
models pioneered by Apple’s iTunes.127 
Scholarly publishers have also long been developing a variety 
of different business models in response to the changes in both 
technology and to the consumption and intellectual demands of their 
various consumers. This includes a variety of paid-for “open access” 
journals in which authors pay for publication of articles (called “gold 
open access” in publishing parlance).128 Of course, given the 
economic realities of publishing, particularly on a massive scale in 
which millions of articles are published in the thousands of different 
scholarly disciplines and sub-disciplines, each with differing 
demands of both authors and readers, such efforts are predicated on 
the basic economic fact that investments in diverse and innovative 
publishing and business models must be supported in some way with 
an expectation of a return on these investments.129 As a result, there 
are now 7,600 open-access journals worldwide that “are highly 
heterogeneous [in] nature and scope.”130 
Unfortunately, scholarly publishers have labored outside of the 
public limelight, especially in their massive and innovative 
investments in and creation of online and digital distribution 
platforms in the last twenty years. Details of their business 
enterprises are surprisingly unknown even to the academics and 
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scholars who produce and consume their product, i.e., journal 
articles. As one court observed sardonically: “It is not surprising that 
[scholarly] authors favor liberal photocopying . . . . But the authors 
have not risked their capital to achieve dissemination. The publishers 
have.”131  
As the preceding discussion reveals, scholarly publishers have 
indeed risked substantial resources in both creating and maintaining 
innovative distribution mechanisms in both online and other digital 
formats. When the Internet revolution began in earnest in the early 
1990s, they invested $100s millions in creating the resources 
necessary for digital distribution of scholarly research—setting up 
server farms, creating websites, creating software for online 
publication, coding newly published articles and images, archiving 
old publications, and providing ongoing digital services, such as 
hypertext linking for citations, email alerts, and apps for mobile 
devices, among many other services. They created and sustain to this 
day peer review systems that ensure quality and trustworthiness in 
academic scholarship, especially in the scientific, technical, and 
medical fields. Moreover, it was scholarly publishers who conceived, 
created, and maintained private consortia, such as the Copyright 
Clearance Center and, in the modern digital era, CrossRef and its 
many progeny, which have ensured efficient access to works and a 
vastly expanded interconnection of knowledge. It is only because of 
these massive investments, financial and otherwise, that scholars 
today can so easily access and situate research within a global 
network of accumulated knowledge in ways that were unimaginable 
just two decades ago.  
CONCLUSION 
Academic and scholarly discourse is often referred to as a 
“marketplace of ideas.”132 Scholarly publishing represents a unique 
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combination of a marketplace in both goods and ideas—and 
publishers continue in the modern age to serve the important 
function of ensuring efficient, high-quality distribution of ideas 
through the digital mechanisms they have created. As a result, new 
research is now delivered to scholarly consumers through websites, 
push technology via email, and new mobile platforms with apps for 
smart phones and tablets. 
When the bias created by the incentive-to-create conventional 
wisdom is stripped away, it is clear that copyright law secures to 
both creators and publishers the fruits of their productive labors. 
Understanding the commercialization policy is important because it 
brings into focus the degree to which scholarly publishers are 
exemplars of the foundational policies that animate the American 
copyright system. Given that scholarly researchers are not motivated 
by traditional copyright incentives in writing their articles, the 
creation and dissemination of their published research in formats that 
are accessible, standardized, reliable, and networked is entirely the 
result of the investments in innovative business models by scholarly 
publishers. Scholarly publishers thus serve an essential function in 
copyright law by conceiving, investing in, and creating the 
innovative distribution mechanisms that fulfill the constitutional goal 
of copyright to advance the “progress of science.” 

